Wednesday, September 14, 2005


gram-a unit of measurement for mass/weight
gram-equivilent to one paper clip
miligram-equivilent to 1/1000 of a paperclip
nanogram-1/10,000,000,000 of a paperclip
GC-abbreviation for "gas chromatography"
Gas Chromatography-chromatography in which the sample mixture is vaporized and injected into a stream of carrier gas (as nitrogen or helium) moving through a column containing a stationary phase composed of a liquid or a particulate solid and is separated into its component compoud
MS-abbreviation for "mass spectrometry"
Mass Spectometry-: an instrumental method for identifying the chemical constitution of a substance by means of the separation of gaseous ions according to their differing mass and charge -- called also mass spectroscopy

Tuesday, September 13, 2005


Arnold, W. and K Pushel (1981) Experimental studies on har as an indicator of past or present drug use. Journal of Forensic Science, 21: 83.

Baumgartner, W., V. Hill and W. Blahd (1989) Hair Analysis for drugs of abuse. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 34 (6): 1433-1453.

Blank, D. and D. Kidwell, (1993) External contamination of the hair by drugs of abuse: an issue in forensic interpretation. Forensic Science International, 63: 145-56.

Cirimele, V. (1996) Cannabis and Amphetamine Determination in Human Hair. In P. Kintz (ed.) Drug Testing in Hair. New York: CRC Press 181-9.

Barrett S. Commercial hair analysis: science or scam? JAMA. 1985;254:1041-1045.

Cone, E., D. Yousenjad, W. Darwin and T. Maguire (1991). Testing human hair for drugs of abuse. II. Identification of Uniqure Cocaine Metabolites in Hair of Drug Abusers and Evaluation of Decontamination Procedures. Journal of Analytic Toxicology, 15: 250-55.

Garside, D. and B. Goldberger (1996) Determination of Cocaine and Opiods in Hair. IN P. Kintz (ed.) Drug Testing in Hair. New York: CRC Press, 151-180.

Ishiyama, I., T. Nagai and S. Toshida (1983) Detection of basic drugs (methamphetamine, antidepressants, and nicotine) from human hair. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 28 (2): 380-5.

Kintz, P. and V. Cirimele (1997) Interlaboratory comparison of quantitative determiantion of amphetamine and related compounds in hair samples. Forensic Science International. 84: 151-156.

Bailey, Drug Screening in an Unconventional Matrix, 262 J.A.M.A 3331 (1989).

Lewis, D., C. Moore, P. Morrissey and J. Leikin, (1997) Determination of drug exposure using hair: application to child protection cases. Forensic Science International. 84: 123-8.

Mieczkowiski, T. (1996) The use of hair analysis for detection of drugs: an overview. Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine , 3: 59-71.

Accuracy of Hair Mineral AnalysisWatts et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 1576-1578.

Copy of Court Filing: Motion in Limine

Names Redacted, )

COMES NOW, Jason Gann, attorney for name redacted, the mother of the above named children, and in support of this Motion in Limine, states:
1. At the initial hearing on the State’s petition in the above-entitled matter, the mother denied the allegations in the petition and requested a contested adjudicatory hearing.
2. Also at the initial hearing, the Department of Human Services (the Department) submitted a report to the court dated 08/04/200_.
3. Three pages of the Department’s report purport to be the scientific, technical, and specialized opinions of the United States Drug Testing Laboratories and its agents.
4. Iowa Code § 232.96 (6) provides that in an adjudicatory hearing:
A report, study, record, or other writing or an audiotape or videotape recording made by the department of human services, a juvenile court officer, a peace officer or a hospital relating to a child in a proceeding under this division is admissible notwithstanding any objection to hearsay statements contained in it provided it is relevant and material and provided its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The circumstances of the making of the report, study, record or other writing or an audiotape or videotape recording, including the maker's lack of personal knowledge, may be proved to affect its weight.
5. The three pages of the Department’s report are not a report study, record, or other writing, made by the Department, but are the raw scientific, technical, and specialized data made by unknown persons to which only an expert can draw a reliable inference.
6. Iowa Rules of Evidence Article VII specifically applies when the court is presented with the raw scientific, technical, and specialized data to which only an expert can draw a reliable inference.
7. Prejudice to the mother will be present if the three pages of the Department’s report are admitted within the § 232.96 (6) exception as:
a. A layperson cannot draw a reliable inference from that data;
b. There is no opportunity to cross-exam the United States Drug Testing Laboratories or its agents with respect to the sufficiency of the facts or data;
c. There is no opportunity to cross-exam the United States Drug Testing Laboratories or its agents with respect to the principles and methods applied to produce the facts or data; and
d. There is no opportunity to cross-exam the United States Drug Testing Laboratories or its agents with respect to whether they applied those principles and methods reliably.
8. Because the three pages of the Department’s report are the raw scientific, technical, and specialized data to which only an expert can draw a reliable inference and because of the likelihood of prejudice to the mother, these portions of the Department’s report do not fall within § 232.96 (6) exception, and the Iowa Rules of Evidence apply at the adjudicatory hearing.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned attorney prays the Court enter an order limiting the State’s case by excluding the three pages of the Department’s report which contain the raw scientific, technical, and specialized data without proving foundation according to the Rules of Evidence.


Jason Gann #19161
311 East Fourth Street P. O. Box 325
Copies to: Waterloo, Iowa 50704
Counsel of Record 319-232-2700; Fax 319-232-2788
DHS Attorney for mother

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing instrument was served upon
all parties to the above cause on each of the attorneys of record herein at
their respective addresses disclosed on the pleadings on , 2005.
By: ___U S Mail ___ Hand Delivered ___Fax ___Federal Express ___Other
Signature: ________________________________________

Monday, September 12, 2005

CLIA-5. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 final rule. 57 Federal Register, 7002-7186 (1992).

Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 final rule. 57 Federal Register, 7002-7186 (1992).

Dr. Quigg

David QuigDoctor's DataDay #1
Dr. Quig, from Doctor's Data (a commercial laboratory), expressed extreme gratitude for being invited to this meeting and offered his opinion on a variety of topics related to analytical methods and factors affecting the interpretation of laboratory results:

As a screening tool, no one laboratory test exists that is absolutely definitive. It is critical that hair analysis results be looked at in careful consideration of patient symptoms and exposures. Hair analysis is not a test to end all tests.

A targeted approach is necessary for certain elements. There is no question, for example, that chromium is extremely difficult to measure. One laboratory using high-resolution mass spectrometry is getting closer to being able to measure Cr6+ in blood. However, interference problems do not exist for all the elements.

Hair treatment is an important issue and clearly affects hair analysis results. Dr. Quig has worked on a study of 150 hair products (pre-published status); the most common contaminants identified include tin, aluminum, silicone, and phosphorous. Only two products have been found to contain mercury and arsenic (Denorex and Aquanet), which could confound hair analysis for these elements.

Ethnicity/race needs to be factored in when evaluating hair analysis results. For example, the reference ranges for Caucasians should not be used for African Americans. The basic profile is very different between the two.

With respect to growth rates, the difference between the very young and the very old is significant.

Distinguishing internal versus external levels is impossible. Some laboratories claim they have an algorithm for making such distinctions. Any such claim should be seriously questioned.

In Dr. Quig's experience, laboratories do take into account the type of container in which samples are stored.

Using hair analysis for an individual can be acceptable and useful—for example, when tracking occupational exposures of a particular person over time (e.g., a worker exposed to lead).

Washing procedures are a critical part of the hair analysis protocol (with the possible exception of methyl mercury testing). It would not be desirable, for example, to test unwashed dreadlocks.

The only time Dr. Quig has seen significantly elevated mercury in hair levels in non-fish-eating individuals is with dentists exposed occupationally to mercury vapor. In questioning whether this was internal or external contamination, a comparison of scalp and pubic hair confirmed equally high levels; this suggested internal exposure. Again, it is critical to look at hair analysis screening in context of other measurements (e.g., blood).

As indicated by the panel, it is important to realize that the presence of organic toxins (e.g., DDT) is not "normal." It is equally important to recognize that we are all subjected to exposure to a variety of organic compounds and toxic metals. It is therefore important to consider multiple exposures.

Standardization of laboratories is a necessity. The same methods and sensitivities should be required. It is not surprising that Seidel et al. (2001) found different reference ranges across the laboratories studied, because the laboratories used different analytical methods (i.e., ICP-MS versus OES) that have a 1,000-fold difference in the detection limits. This discrepancy should not be used as a reason for not using hair analysis, but as the impetus for advocating standard protocols.

Day #2Dr. Quig provided more comments toward the end of the second day of the meeting. His stated opinions are summarized below:

If done correctly, hair analysis can be a useful tool.

No question exists that gross ineptness has been observed at some commercial laboratories. The issue of interlaboratory differences is not sufficient reason, however, to conclude that hair analysis is not of value. It is simply a question of tightening up sampling/analytical protocols and QA/QC procedures.

Regarding quality control issues, Doctor's Data has been pressing for the establishment of standardized procedures for hair analysis under CLIA and the Health Care Financing Administration. The fact that procedures are not yet in place is not a reason not to do hair analysis; it is a matter of the organizations catching up with the needs of the time.

Regarding washing protocols: A laboratory should produce a reasonable report describing its washing protocol. The user of the data should look for this information before interpreting the data.

A standardized procedure can and should be set for sample collection.

Statements by panelists regarding the over-interpretation and misuse of hair analysis were not relevant to the specific charge of this meeting and should not be of concern to ATSDR.

Doctor's Data only accepts hair samples from licensed physicians or for research purposes. Dr. Quig agreed that hair samples should only be submitted by trained practitioners.

Dr. Quig suggested looking at research conducted by Needleman (University of Pittsburgh) and Masters (Dartmouth) before dismissing the utility of hair analysis for evaluating lead exposures.

Sound literature does exist on manganese and aberrant behavior, although the literature is criticized by the panel. Dr. Quig referenced a follow-up study comparing manganese levels in prisoners committing violent versus nonviolent crimes. With regards to the symptoms and the neurotoxicity of manganese, psychological effects range from apathy progressing to violent reactions and loss of tolerance. The physiology of manganese toxicity is well-established in the literature. Manganese has a high propensity to bind to myelin pigmented dopaminergic neurons in the brain.

Reference ranges are not based exclusively on small data pools (e.g., "n=2"), as suggested during some of the panel discussions. Available reference ranges are based on 28 years of doing hair analysis. As methods improve, so will reference ranges. Data sets are expanding to include documentation of variations in levels of elements between Caucasians and African Americans, as well as transcontinental differences.

New Developments in Biological Measures of Drug Prevalence by Edward J Cone

Factors to Consider When Using Hair as a Cocaine-Exposure Meaure for Mothers or Newborns by Paul R. Marques

JAMA Article

Determination of gestational cocaine exposure by hair analysis
K. Graham, G. Koren, J. Klein, J. Schneiderman and M. Greenwald Department of Pediatrics, Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada.
Drug self-reports are often unreliable and standard blood and urine tests detect only recent cocaine use. Since cocaine is deposited in hair, we have applied a radioimmunoassay to hair extract to detect past cocaine use. Hair from 16 adult users was positive for benzoylecgonine, in the presence of negative findings from urine screening tests. Benzoylecgonine in admitted heavy users averaged 8775 ng/g of hair (range, 640 to 29,089 ng/g of hair), whereas in occasional users it averaged 624 ng/g of hair (range, 32 to 1210 ng/g of hair). Benzoylecgonine was not detected in hair of 21 adults who reported no use of cocaine ever and whose urine samples were negative for the metabolite. Neonatal hair from seven infants whose mothers were known cocaine users averaged 5430 ng of benzoylecgonine per gram of hair (range, 200 to 27500 ng/g of hair). Hair from two infants 2.5 and 3.5 months of age averaged 6050 ng of benzoylecgonine per gram of hair. However, values were negative for infants 1 year and older, corresponding to loss of fetal hair in the few months after birth. Because studies reporting reproductive risks of cocaine compare exposed and nonexposed groups, validation of drug-free status of control subjects is extremely important. Hair analysis may remedy the disadvantages of currently used methods and may identify intrauterine exposure to cocaine in babies when a maternal drug history is not available or of doubtful truthfulness.


Page 611
914 P.2d 611
112 Nev. 275, 11 IER Cases 1110
NEVADA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, Stanley P. Jones, inHis Capacity as Executive Director, and Linda K. Lee, in HerCapacity as Chairwoman of the Nevada Employment SecurityDepartment Board of Review; Carol Stewart, in Her Capacityas a Member of the Nevada Employment Security DepartmentBoard of Review, and Walt Henderson, in His Capacity as aMember of the Nevada Employment Security Department Board ofReview, and Hotel San Remo, Appellants,v.Cynthia HOLMES, Respondent.
No. 26157.
Supreme Court of Nevada.
April 3, 1996.Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1996.

[112 Nev. 276] Crowell, Susich, Owen & Tackes, Carson City, for Appellant Employment Security.
Kamer & Zucker, Las Vegas, for Appellant Hotel San Remo.
John J. Tofano, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
Keefer, O'Reilly & Ferrario, Las Vegas; and Rudnick & Wolfe and Stephen A. Landsman, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce and MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.
[112 Nev. 277] OPINION
Respondent Cynthia Holmes ("Holmes") was employed by appellant Hotel San Remo ("San Remo") as a slot hostess from August 31, 1990, until February 9, 1993, when she was terminated for failing a drug test.
Holmes applied for unemployment benefits with appellant Nevada Employment Security Department ("NESD"). NESD denied Holmes' application for unemployment benefits due to her work-related misconduct. Holmes appealed the denial of her unemployment benefits. NESD's determination was subsequently upheld by both the appeals referee and the NESD Board of Review. Holmes petitioned the district court for judicial review. The district court reversed the denial of unemployment benefits because it held that substantial evidence did not support NESD's decision. San Remo and NESD now appeal to this court.
We conclude that substantial evidence supported NESD's finding of work-related misconduct
Page 613
sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order reversing the Board of Review's decision and reinstate the Board of Review's decision.
Holmes was employed by San Remo between August 31, 1990, and February 9, 1993, until she was terminated. In April 1992, Holmes was promoted to the position of slot hostess for San Remo's Money Club (San Remo's slot players club). As part of her job responsibilities, Holmes greeted patrons, assisted in conducting the audit of the Money Club, kept records of cash given to players and occasionally gave complimentary benefits to players. [112 Nev. 278] Additionally, Holmes had access to San Remo's computer system.
In April 1992, San Remo informed its employees that it would be initiating a random drug-testing program. San Remo informed all employees that they would be given ninety days notice of their testing date and that failure to pass the drug test would result in termination.
San Remo used a hair analysis test, known as a radioimmunoassay hair analysis ("RIA"), as its drug testing methodology. 1 In the event of a positive result on the RIA screening, a confirmatory gas chromatography/mass spectrometry ("GC/MS") test is performed. If the GC/MS confirmatory test yields a positive result, the result is reported to the employer. The RIA screening and GC/MS confirmatory test utilized by San Remo tested employees for cocaine ingestion during the ninety days immediately preceding the tests.
San Remo gave Holmes ninety days notice that she would be tested on January 18, 1993. Holmes voluntarily agreed to take the test. Holmes' January 18, 1993 test showed the presence of cocaine at a level of 120 nanograms per 10 milligrams. However, due to concerns regarding the chain of custody of the hair sample, Holmes was tested a second time. The second test, conducted on January 28, 1993, found cocaine at a level of 98 nanograms per 10 milligrams.
As a result of the positive test results, San Remo terminated Holmes' employment. On February 21, 1993, Holmes filed a claim with NESD for unemployment compensation. Pursuant to NRS 612.385, NESD denied Holmes' claim because she was terminated for misconduct. Holmes appealed the denial of her unemployment benefits. NESD's appeals referee and the Board of Review affirmed the denial of Holmes' claim.
On September 9, 1993, Holmes filed a petition for judicial review. On July 29, 1994, the district court reversed the Board of Review's decision to deny Holmes' claim. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court stated that "an employee failing an employee's drug screen, absent any corroborating evidence of on-or-off-duty [sic] drug related activity, is not misconduct connected with work disqualifying a claimant like [Holmes] from unemployment insurance benefits." (Emphasis added.) The district court further held that "there is no substantial, credible, [112 Nev. 279] and reliable evidence in the whole record that [Holmes] ... used cocaine in the 90-day period preceding the dates [San Remo] administered random hair drug screens." Additionally, the district court stated that "hair drug screens, standing alone, are scientifically unreliable at this time to sufficiently form a legal basis for disqualifying claimants for state unemployment insurance benefits without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the district court held that NESD's decision to deny Holmes unemployment benefits was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of government discretion.
San Remo and NESD appeal, arguing that (1) the district court erred in reversing the administrative agency's decision that RIA hair testing is a valid and reasonable testing
Page 614
methodology; and (2) the district court erred in reversing the administrative agency's decision that failure of an RIA test constitutes misconduct connected with work, thereby warranting a denial of unemployment benefits.
In the present case, we are presented with two questions: first, whether the results of Holmes' drug test constitute substantial evidence; and second, whether Holmes' violation of San Remo's drug-free workplace policy constitutes misconduct pursuant to NRS 612.385.
Whether the results of Holmes' drug test constitute substantial evidence
This court has continuously recognized that "[w]hen a decision of an administrative body is challenged, the function of this court is identical to that of the district court. It is to review the evidence presented to the administrative body and ascertain whether that body acted arbitrarily or capriciously, thus abusing its discretion." Gandy v. State ex rel. Div. Investigation, 96 Nev. 281, 282, 607 P.2d 581, 582 (1980) (citations omitted). The Gandy court further stated that this court "may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Id.; see also NRS 233B.135(3). Furthermore, this court must "affirm the decision of the administrative agency on questions of fact if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record." SIIS v. Thomas, 101 Nev. 293, 295, 701 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1985).
Accordingly, because the present issue deals with a question of [112 Nev. 280] fact, our review is limited to determining whether the appeals officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
"Substantial evidence has been defined as that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
In the present case, the appeals referee made the following findings of fact: (1) the preponderance of the evidence establishes that hair drug testing done properly is an accepted form of drug testing; and (2) the testimony indicates that Holmes' hair drug testing was done properly. These findings of fact were subsequently adopted in whole by the Board of Review in affirming the appeals referee's decision.
Although we recognize that innovative scientific technologies are always susceptible to criticism, our review of the record indicates that the Board of Review's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we must reverse the district court's order and reinstate the Board of Review's decision.
In the present case, the appeals referee based her decision that RIA testing was an acceptable manner of drug testing on the holding in United States v. Medina, 749 F.Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y.1990), the testimony of two experts, and scientific journals presented by appellants. Considered as a whole, we conclude that this evidence satisfies this court's definition of substantial evidence. See Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. at 608, 729 P.2d at 498.
In Medina, the court had to determine whether RIA hair analysis was an acceptable form of drug testing and whether a positive RIA test warranted revocation of an individual's probation. Medina, 749 F.Supp. at 60. The Medina court stated that "[a] court should take judicial notice of the relevant body of scientific literature to assist it in evaluating advances in scientific techniques such as RIA hair analysis." Id. at 61. The Medina court further stated that "[e]xtensive scientific writings on RIA hair analysis establishes both its reliability and its acceptance in the field of forensic toxicology when used to determine cocaine use." Id. (citing Arnold, Radioimmunological Hair Analysis for Narcotics and Substitutes, 25 J. Clinical Chemistry and Clinical Biochemistry 753 (1987) (hair analysis is an effective method for detecting narcotics); Balabanova, Brunner & Nowak, Radioimmunological Determination of Cocaine in Human Hair, 98 Z Rechtsmed 229 (1987) (RIA hair analysis is an accurate method for determining the presence
Page 615
of cocaine); Baumgartner, Baer, Hill & Blahd, Hair Analysis for Drugs of Abuse in Parole/Probation [112 Nev. 281] Populations, National Institute for Justice Final Report (grant 86-IJ-CX-0029) (study compared the results of RIA hair analysis with urinalysis and determined that hair analysis provided more accurate detection rates); Baumgartner, Hill & Blahd, Hair Analysis for Drugs of Abuse, 34 J. Forensic Sciences 1433 (1989) (hair analysis is an effective means for identifying drug abusers); Graham, Koren, Klein, Schneiderman & Greenwald, Determination of Gestational Cocaine Exposure by Hair Analysis, 262 J.A.M.A. 3328 (1989) (RIA hair analysis may remedy the disadvantages of standard blood and urine tests); Harkey & Henderson, Hair Analysis for Drugs of Abuse in 2 Advances in Analytical Toxicology 298 (R. Baselt ed. 1989) (hair analysis can provide a more accurate history of drug use than conventional urinalysis)). The Medina court concluded that "[t]he results of the hair analysis report are accepted as some proof that probationer violated the conditions of his probation." Medina, 749 F.Supp. at 62.
The first expert witness San Remo presented at the hearing before the appeals referee was Chris Berka ("Berka"). Berka was vice-president of marketing for Psychemedics Corporation ("Psychemedics"), the company that developed RIA testing procedures, trained San Remo's personnel and conducted the actual testing of the hair samples. Berka, who was also a research scientist and a candidate for a Ph.D. in neurosciences at the University of California, San Diego, testified that a recent report concluded that Psychemedics' RIA testing was 100 percent accurate in avoiding false positives on 400 "blind samples" submitted by an independent quality assurance organization. San Remo's second expert witness was Dr. Arthur McBay ("McBay"). McBay was a research toxicologist, a Professor Emeritus, School of Pharmacology, and an adjunct professor, Department of Pathology, at the University of North Carolina. Although McBay recognized the potential for inaccuracies in all drug testing procedures, including blood and urine testing, he testified that the RIA drug testing methodology employed by San Remo was widely accepted in the scientific community.
In addition to the plethora of articles cited by the Medina court, the record further reflects that the appeals referee relied upon several articles from various scientific and medical journals to support her conclusion that RIA testing was a valid and reasonable drug testing methodology.
Although not necessary for our conclusion that the appeals referee's finding was supported by substantial evidence, we note that our ruling is consistent with several recent cases decided by other courts regarding the veracity of RIA test results. See Bass v. Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement, 627 So.2d 1321, 1322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993)[112 Nev. 282] (concluding that RIA analysis of hair is generally accepted in the scientific community); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 157 Misc.2d 353, 596 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1993) (concluding that the process of RIA testing in human hair, when used in conjunction with GC/MS confirmatory testing, "has been accepted by the scientific community as a reliable and accurate method of ascertaining and measuring the use of cocaine by human subjects.").
We acknowledge that there are, arguably, no certainties in science. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Nonetheless, we conclude that RIA testing, especially when coupled with a confirmatory GC/MS test, is now an accepted and reliable scientific methodology for detecting illicit drug use. Accordingly, we conclude that the administrative agency's factual finding was supported by substantial evidence and that the district court erroneously substituted its own judgment for that of the administrative agency regarding a question of fact. See Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. at 607-08, 729 P.2d at 498.
Whether Holmes' violation of San Remo's drug-free workplace policy constitutes misconduct
Pursuant to NRS 612.385, a person is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he has
Page 616
engaged in misconduct. 2 This court has stated that
an employee is guilty of "misconduct connected with his work" when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer, or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer.
Clevenger v. Employment Security Dep't, 105 Nev. 145, 150, 770 P.2d 866, 868 (1989) (quoting Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 249 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1978)).
[112 Nev. 283] This court has indicated that when analyzing the concept of misconduct, the trier of fact must consider the legal definition in context with the factual circumstances surrounding the conduct at issue. Garman v. State, Employment Security Dep't, 102 Nev. 563, 565, 729 P.2d 1335, 1336 (1986). This court has stated that "[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review by this court on appeal." SIIS v. Snyder, 109 Nev. 1223, 1227, 865 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1993). However, "an agency's conclusions of law which are closely related to the agency's view of the facts are entitled to deference and should not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence." SIIS v. Khweiss, 108 Nev. 123, 126, 825 P.2d 218, 220 (1992).
In the present case, the appeals referee determined that Holmes' failure of her RIA screening and GC/MS confirmatory test constituted misconduct pursuant to NRS 612.385, thereby warranting a denial of her unemployment benefits. Although this court has never specifically addressed the present issue, we have, on several occasions, examined employers' efforts to ensure that their employees are drug-free. See Blankenship v. O'Sullivan Plastics Corp., 109 Nev. 1162, 866 P.2d 293 (1993); Clevenger, 105 Nev. at 145, 770 P.2d at 866; Fremont Hotel v. Esposito, 104 Nev. 394, 760 P.2d 122 (1988).
In Blankenship, an at-will employee was terminated for refusing to sign a substance abuse employee agreement. Blankenship, 109 Nev. at 1163, 866 P.2d at 293. The employee contended that a provision in the agreement violated his constitutional rights against self-incrimination and was, therefore, in violation of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Id. at 1163, 866 P.2d at 294. We affirmed the propriety of the employee's dismissal, which was based solely on "his noncompliance with company policy, i.e., refusing to sign the [a]greement." Id. at 1163-64, 866 P.2d at 294. The Blankenship court stated that "we are unaware of any prevailing public policy against employers seeking to provide safe and lawful working conditions through testing programs designed to identify and eliminate the use of illicit drugs and alcohol." Id. at 1166, 866 P.2d at 295.
In Clevenger, an employee who was involved in an industrial accident was ordered, per company policy, to submit to a drug screening. Clevenger, 105 Nev. at 147, 770 P.2d at 867. The results of the drug screening were positive, showing the presence of THC metabolites, an element of marijuana. Id. The employee was later allowed to return to work, subject to random drug tests. Id. at 148, 770 P.2d at 867. The results from a subsequent random drug test were positive, and the employee was terminated. Id. The employee's request for unemployment benefits was [112 Nev. 284] denied by NESD because she was terminated for misconduct within the meaning of NRS 612.385. Id. In affirming the denial of the employee's unemployment benefits, due to her misconduct connected with work, we stated:
When off-the-job conduct violates an employer's rule or policy, such as prohibiting the use of marijuana, an analysis must be made to determine if the employer's rule or policy has a reasonable relationship to
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the work to be performed; and if so, whether there has been an intentional violation or willful disregard of that rule or policy.
Id. at 150, 770 P.2d at 868.
In Fremont Hotel, an employer suspected an employee of being under the influence and ordered her to undergo an immediate drug test. Fremont Hotel, 104 Nev. at 395, 760 P.2d at 122-23. When the employee refused to undergo the drug test, the employee was terminated. Id. at 395, 760 P.2d at 122. The Board of Review subsequently denied the employee's unemployment benefits because she was fired for misconduct, i.e., her refusal to take an immediate drug test. Id. at 395, 760 P.2d at 123. We affirmed the Board of Review's decision to deny unemployment benefits to the employee because she was discharged for misconduct pursuant to NRS 612.385. Id. at 398, 760 P.2d at 124. We stated that "[m]isconduct may be established by 'a deliberate violation or disregard on the part of the employee of standards of behavior which his employer has the right to expect.' " Id. at 397, 760 P.2d at 123-24 (quoting Barnum v. Williams, 84 Nev. 37, 41, 436 P.2d 219, 222 (1968)); see also Lellis v. Archie, 89 Nev. 550, 553, 516 P.2d 469, 470-71 (1973) (concluding that misconduct is generally understood as any improper conduct or behavior).
Admittedly, the facts of the cases described above are somewhat different from the facts of the present case. However, we conclude that the cases illustrate this court's general philosophy regarding illicit drugs in the workplace: employers have compelling reasons, both economic and social, to test their employees for drugs.
We conclude that San Remo's drug-free policy had a reasonable relation to the work performed by Holmes. The record indicates that Holmes was entrusted with San Remo's computer system, its Money Club and oftentimes handled large amounts of San Remo's cash. Additionally, Holmes' job duties included a substantial amount of personal interaction with San Remo's guests. Accordingly, we conclude that San Remo had a justifiable reason for demanding that Holmes refrain from using cocaine.
[112 Nev. 285] We further note that Holmes intentionally violated San Remo's drug-free workplace policy. Holmes was given ninety days notice that she would be tested for drug use. The ninety-day warning allowed Holmes the opportunity to comply with the company policy, had she abstained from using cocaine. Yet, the RIA screening and GC/MS test revealed that Holmes used cocaine within the preceding ninety-day period. Accordingly, we conclude that Holmes' ingestion of cocaine within that ninety-day period was an intentional and willful violation of a valid and reasonable company policy.
Based upon our earlier conclusion that RIA testing coupled with a confirmatory GC/MS test is a valid drug-testing methodology, we conclude that Holmes' ingestion of cocaine, subsequently proven by the RIA screening and confirmatory GC/MS test, constitutes misconduct within the definition of NRS 612.385. Therefore, we conclude that the appeals referee's conclusion of law should not have been disturbed by the district court because it was amply supported by evidence that Holmes was terminated for misconduct due to her violation of San Remo's drug-free workplace policy.
We have considered Holmes' other contentions on appeal and conclude that they are without merit.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court's order reversing the Board of Review's decision and reinstate the board of review's decision to deny Holmes unemployment benefits.
1 The Supreme Court of New York succinctly stated that "[t]he theory behind the [RIA] test is that cocaine fossilizes in the user's hair as it grows. Therefore, the test could purportedly indicate use of cocaine several months prior to the test (unlike blood and urine tests which only determine ingestion within days of the test)." Burgel v. Burgel, 141 A.D.2d 215, 533 N.Y.S.2d 735, 735 (1988).
2 Specifically, NRS 612.385 states that
[a] person is ineligible for [unemployment] benefits for the week in which he has filed a claim for benefits, if he was discharged from his last or next to last employment for misconduct connected with his work, and remains ineligible until he earns remuneration in covered employment equal to or exceeding his weekly benefit amount in each of not more than 15 weeks thereafter as determined by the administrator in each case according to the seriousness of the misconduct.